Research projects
Enforcement of EU Law
Currently, my main research project investigates the interactions between the European Commission, the Member States and the ECJ in enforcing EU law. The aim is to understand the strategic implications of the EU infringement procedures and the broader intention is to contribute to a more general theory of dispute-resolution mechanisms in multi-level systems of governance. The project is supported by a VENI grant provided by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
Asylum Policy in the EU
What influences the variation in asylum applications and recognition rates? Despite its obvious practical relevance, this question has not received a satisfactory answer in the academic literature. This paper focuses on the impact of the EU on asylum policy outcomes in 29 European states and argues that there has been no race to the bottom with respect to recognition rates and admitted refugees, but despite the relative convergence important national differences persist and the asylum burden has not become more equally-distributed across the European recipient countries. Currently, I am working on a dynamic theory of asylum applications and recognition rates that is going to be tested using multi-level statistical models.
The Diffusion of Anti-smoking Policy
What explains the differences in the timing and strictness of anti-tobacco legislation adopted by the European states? Such questions of comparative public policy continue to fascinate me. In my first paper on the issue I argue that party ideological preferences cannot account for the pattern of adoptions of smoking bans (in bars and restaurants) in Europe, but public support for the measures, smoking prevalence, the economic importance of tobacco growing for a country, and policy diffusion are important factors affecting the timing of adoption and the strictness of the bans. Right now I am in the process of working on another paper which focuses on the case of the Netherlands and explores the links between the agenda setting, decision making and policy implementation stages in the shaping of Dutch anti-smoking policy.
Legislative Duration and Decision Making in the EU
What are the determinants of the duration of legislative decision making? Together with my colleague at Leiden Anne Rasmussen we tackle this question from a number of perspectives. This article argues that the European Parliament uses more time for deliberation under the co-decision versus the consultation procedure even after controlling for the character of the files. This article shows that the negotiation of legislation under the so-called co-decision 'early agreements' (trilogues) takes longer than that of similar files that go to second reading and conciliation, especially when really salient issues are at stake. In this paper we demonstrate that the involvement of interest groups during legislative preparation (and the diversity of the consulted groups) increases duration, while the type of consultation does not matter.
The Macro-Politics of the EU
What are the dynamic relationships between public opinion, party preferences, interest groups, and the policy output of the EU? In this article I argue that the amount of important legislation that the EU produces follows the ebbs and flows of EU public support (but not vice versa) and that, surprisingly, the relationship holds up till the mid-1990s but disappears afterwards. Together with Frank Haege we show that the Commission proposes more legislation when it faces more EU-friendly governments in the Council of Ministers. In an ongoing project with a team of current and former colleagues at Leiden we investigate the dynamic links between the interest group system and legislative output.
Transposition and Implementation of EU Law
The implementation of EU policy at the national level is exciting because the countries have much discretion in deciding when and how to implement the laws decided in Brussels.
My PhD thesis examined the process of compliance with EU legislation in the Central and Eastern European countries during their accession negotiations. I developed a decision theoretical model which provides hypotheses about the impact of administrative and policy making capacities, policy preferences and discretion. This article shows that the CEE countries having higher bureaucratic quality and more right-wing governments have performed better in implementing EU directives. This article makes a similar argument for the particular case of social policy. Here, we (with Antoaneta Dimitrova) argue that the strength (but not the organizational type) of EU co-ordination units of the CEE governments influence positively compliance with EU law.
Analysing the implementation of EU directives in all 27 member states, we (with Bernard Steunenberg) demonstrate that legal fit and discretion are significant determinants of the timeliness of implementation. In this article (and this reply to the reply) I take issue with the argument that implementation patterns can be related to certain 'cultures of compliance'. Finally (for now), I have developed systematic reviews of the statistical and qualitative literatures on the topic (available online here and here), and my discussions of the state of the art of these literatures can be found here and here.
Institutional Change in Government Organizations
Why do governments change their organizational structures? Despite the myriads of organizational births, deaths, mergers, fusions and splits in the public sector, there is surprisingly little theory addressing the causes of government re-organizations, and even less so addressing their effects. In my MA thesis I argue that the pattern of government reorganizations in Bulgaria reveals that it is the desire of politicians to capture the organizations rather than concerns about efficiency that explains the constant cycles of organizational reforms in the country. In this article co-authored with Antoaneta Dimitrova, we look at the re-organizations of the EU co-ordination structures of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe and conclude that the organizational configurations reflect the power balance between the major political actors in a country and the changes have little to do with path dependency or efficiency concerns but follow power shifts after elections.