

This article was downloaded by:[Swets Content Distribution]
On: 23 January 2008
Access Details: [subscription number 768307933]
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



West European Politics

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713395181>

The Dynamics of Domestic Coordination of EU Policy in the New Member States: Impossible to Lock In?

Antoaneta Dimitrova; Dimiter Toshkov

Online Publication Date: 01 November 2007

To cite this Article: Dimitrova, Antoaneta and Toshkov, Dimiter (2007) 'The Dynamics of Domestic Coordination of EU Policy in the New Member States: Impossible to Lock In?', *West European Politics*, 30:5, 961 - 986

To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/01402380701617381

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380701617381>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf>

This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

The Dynamics of Domestic Coordination of EU Policy in the New Member States: Impossible to Lock In?

ANTOANETA DIMITROVA and DIMITER TOSHKOV

This paper examines the evolution of coordination structures for EU policy-making in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The study maps the main features of the established EU coordination machineries, and traces the most important reforms of their organisational structures. It proposes an actor-centred, 'politics of institutional choice' approach to explain the rapid and far-reaching changes in EU coordination structures in all the new member states. By contrast, two alternative frameworks focusing on efficiency and historical-institutional arguments emphasising the impact of early institutional lock-in fail to explain the specific institutional forms adopted and the considerable degree of institutional dynamics.

Participation in the multi-level system of governance in the European Union demands much from national public administrations. Membership in the EU political system creates considerable challenges for the development of timely, coherent, and effective participation in policy-making and implementation (Fournier 1998; Kassim *et al.* 2000; 2001). The previous enlargement of the European Union in particular placed an increasing emphasis on a candidate country's ability to implement the EU *acquis*. For this purpose, the administrative machineries of the candidate states were put under pressure to identify and defend national policy preferences, and to steer institutional change on an immense scale (Dimitrova 2002; Grabbe 2001). Domestic coordination of EU policy has been a crucial and often underestimated aspect of both European integration and EU influence on the member states – Europeanisation. Coordination structures frame, channel and condition the national input to the European level and the European impact on the national level.

Correspondence Address: dimitrova@fsw.leidenuniv.nl; dtoshkov@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

This article presents and analyses the EU coordination structures established in the European Union's new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the period since the start of the accession negotiations in 1997 or 1999. We focus on this period since the early years of existence of coordination structures have been shown to be extremely influential for their long-term development (see the contributions on the early coordination structures of the original six member states collected in Heyen 1992). We examine the evolution of EU coordination structures in ten countries from CEE until mid-2007 when eight of these countries had already been members of the EU for more than two years and Romania and Bulgaria for half a year. The analysis is based on an up-to-date overview of coordination structures compiled through interviews with national experts and analysis of documents. As no systematic comparative data on this issue has been previously available, we devote some space to the presentation and classification of the main features of the coordination systems.

Having made an inventory of the types of rules and institutional location which have embodied coordination of EU matters in the new member states before and after accession, we find that when it comes to EU policy-making, change has been the name of the game. The new member states have changed their EU coordination structures often and repeatedly during the preparation for accession and after they joined the Union. We do not find convergence towards a single system, although several broad patterns of organising the business of coordination can be identified.

In the second part of the article, we attempt to explain the puzzle of this great dynamism of the coordination rules in the broader context of questions of institutional persistence and change. The creation and evolution of EU coordination structures is a good case for comparative analysis of institutional change, since similar countries have devised institutional solutions to the same policy problem in the same period of time. Variation in the domestic solutions to the challenge of EU coordination provides opportunities to investigate how and why (populations of) organisations change.

To explain the considerable degree of institutional dynamics with regard to coordination structures, we propose a framework taking political actors as the main factors behind institutional change and reform. Patterns of institutional change are, according to this approach, related to government changes, inter-institutional rivalries and the balance of power between politicians and top bureaucrats, although EU pressure is ever present as a crucial external variable. We also examine two alternative frameworks that have been used to explain institutional change and persistence. The first is a functional-change approach assuming that changes are a result of adjustments towards greater efficiency under EU pressure. The second, a historical-institutionalist approach, focuses on the influence of previously

existing structures and historical legacies (Lippert and Umbach 2005). After defining the expected outcomes of the three frameworks at similar, mid-range levels, we analyse existing evidence and find that the actor-centred framework matches it best.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the current scholarship on the influence of the EU on national public administrations and examine possible theoretical perspectives on institutional change. Second, the EU coordination structures in CEE are presented. Finally the paper discusses the current shape and the evolution of these structures in view of the elaborated theoretical perspectives.

Sources of Institutional Change

The Politics of Institutional Choice

The explanatory framework which we propose has its roots in rational choice institutionalism and we label it the 'politics of institutional choice'. It predicts high volatility and change of institutions and organisations. This view can be linked to rational choice institutionalism as it treats actors (persons or institutions) as the starting point of the analysis (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997) and traces institutional choice to the induced preferences of the actors over the different institutional configurations. Discussing institutional change, Shepsle (2001: 322) states that 'institutions are durable because politicians want them to be'. Based on his work on democratic consolidation, Gerard Alexander (2001: 249) concludes that 'institutions... are more contingent and susceptible to revision than often thought'. A similar approach has been applied by Jupille (2004) who analyses the 'procedural politics' driving the process of choice of lower-order rules in the EU (see also Farrell and Héritier 2006). In the context of institutional change in the CEE countries, Grzymala-Busse (2006) argues that political competition is a crucial factor in explaining the patterns of design and development of regulatory institutions in the region.

According to the 'politics of institutional choice' perspective, institutional design and change during periods of transformation, as the post-communist period has certainly been, is an instrument used to advance all kinds of exogenous preferences rather than an instrument to solve policy problems and challenges. Made in a context where the opportunity existed to change both constitutional and lower-level rules, decisions about the shape and reform of organisations, in other words choices of the rules about the rules, maximise the short-term gains of the decision-makers and their expected net benefits from one arrangement over another. The substantial institutional effects are only of secondary importance, and unlike the logic of optimisation, the political vision looks into the procedural advantages some institutions provide to some actors and not to others. As with the rest of social life, institutional choice is a power struggle, and institutions are means

rather than ends in themselves. As long as, and to the extent that, decisions for institutional development are in the hands of elected politicians and high-level bureaucrats, they are the main agents of reform. In order to explain persistence or rapid transformation we should not look into the relative efficiency of one coordination system versus another, but investigate the relative advantage it gives to the politicians in power. Sometimes pressures from external actors, appropriateness concerns, or perceived efficiency can tip the balance in favour of one organisational solution or another. But ultimately these factors exercise influence only through altering the utility considerations of the relevant politicians. The actors usually have a great degree of leeway on how to interpret, and whether to amplify, tone down, mute, or override these stimuli for change. Of course, on a very general level historical legacies still limit the repertoire of available institutional choices, but the range of the 'possible' is much wider, more open-ended, and volatile than historical-institutionalist accounts expect.

What are the empirical implications of the 'politics of institutional choice' framework for the development of EU coordination structures in CEE over recent years? First, on the one hand major changes should be related to changes in the governing elites, and in the parties that control the executive in particular. Further, the number and ideological range of political parties participating in the government should increase the fragmentation of the coordination structures. On the other hand, strong bureaucracy with vested interests in the organisational status quo should be able to decrease the rate of change. Inter-institutional rivalries, especially if they are coupled with different political parties holding the portfolios could also contribute to changes in the institutional structure.

The second framework we examine is one which has been implicitly present in numerous comparative studies of administrative developments in post-communist states.

Institutional Development as 'Optimisation'

It seems almost inevitable to resort to functionalist language when discussing organisational and institutional changes. We too often *describe* reforms with expressions like 'responding to the needs for coordination', 'in order to increase the efficiency', 'as a result of the new circumstances'. The descriptive language, however, contains implicit explanatory claims which need to be confronted with the existing empirical evidence. According to this view, institutional changes are driven entirely by a process of adaptation to changes in the external environment (Harmsen 1999). The institutional responses to environmental challenges are efficient in the long term, and failures lead to new rounds of institutional innovation. For neo-classical economic models optimality is the expected result of institutional

innovation under the conditions of full information and absent transaction costs. According to the functionalist logic of this explanation, a particular institutional configuration is chosen because of its effects. The process is sustained by perfect rationality of the actual agents that make the decisions over institutional design. Although in economics this view has become something of a 'folk theorem' (Yao 2004: 446), it still informs to a large extent the practitioners' view of organisational change. An evolutionary version of this model provides a rationale for the underlying functionalist selection mechanism as it posits that inefficient solutions and non-optimal adaptation will be wiped out by the evolutionary forces in the long term. As institutions are merely instrumental, their development is triggered by exogenous changes. One such exogenous factor we can identify is direct pressure for change, as in European Union conditionality. In other words, enlargement demands more efficient management of the preparation and negotiation process, which would be met by institutional adjustment, albeit ineffective or slow when administrative reforms are insufficient. In this more complicated version of the 'optimisation' model, organisations adapt to efficiency concerns and to external pressures for reform. This more complex explanation would come closest to a number of empirical studies focusing on institutional change in Central and Eastern Europe (see for example Hesse *et al.* 1997; Verheijen 2000) under the pressure of EU demands and accession needs. Such explanations, however, are apolitical, whereas the more interesting conditionality models explicitly take into account domestic actors' cost-benefit calculations influencing compliance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005).

What are the implications of the optimisation framework for the development of EU coordination structures? First of all, there should be clear evidence that successful coordination models survive while ones that work poorly get changed until an efficient model is found. In the context of enlargement negotiations, early successful completion of the negotiation stages should reinforce the coordination structures involved. Yet failures and shortcomings in the management of negotiations and the pre-accession *acquis* transposition should lead to institutional changes. Pressure for institutional reform exercised by the EU institutions should be another source of adaptation, and the harder the pressure is, the more likely the reform. Once accession is completed, perceived lack of success in the joint decision-making processes, inefficient defence of national preferences, and sloppy implementation of EU policies should be the main triggers of reform. In the absence of EU pressure and policy failures, institutional persistence is to be expected.

The third framework, which has been prominently represented in studies of post-communist institutions, has strong roots in historical institutionalism.

The Different Faces of Historical Institutionalism

The functionalist logic of the 'optimisation' framework and managerial approaches omits institutional and historical context. Historical-institutionalist accounts bring back into the picture the influence of the past and highlight the constraining nature of institutionalised ways of social and political action (Mahoney and Schensul 2006; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Thelen 1999). We distinguish two versions of the model that follow a slightly different causal logic. In the first, the impact of the past is interpreted in a broad sense and covers all kinds of historical legacies – cultural, political, economic, technological, etc. Institutional design of particular organisations and their subsequent development is over-determined by the broader context which in turn is rather stable and resistant to change. Rather than a functional and efficiency-guided response to changing external environmental characteristics, institutional choice is severely constrained and framed by what is deemed possible by the external environment itself. Here 'institutional fit' enters the framework as only organisations that 'match' with the rest of the environment are adopted and survive (Knill 2001; Knill and Lenschow 1998). Historical legacies and the influence of the past are prominent and established ways of explaining political and social transformations in Central and Eastern Europe (Elster *et al.* 1998; Vachudova 2005). The usefulness of the model is, however, crucially dependent on the ability to narrow down the potential effects of the 'past' and identify concrete mechanisms that specify how certain aspects of the environment produce or inhibit institutional change. In the case of analysing EU coordination structures, legacies could manifest themselves in norms and institutional arrangements inherited from the communist period (Verheijen and Dimitrova 1996), in references to the pre-communist period such as constitutional doctrines or administrative principles. Such a historical-institutionalist interpretation of the evolution of CEE administrations, including coordination structures, can be found in Lippert and Umbach (2005).

A second version of the historical-institutionalist model can be formulated: one directing attention towards the disproportional impact of early institutional choice on the later long-term development (Pierson 2003; Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Institutions get locked in along certain paths while other choices, although formally available and maybe even more efficient, are no longer considered. Increasing returns from such early choices narrow down more and more the range of alternatives available and prohibit any switch between development paths. With regard to EU coordination, the institutional lock-in hypothesis implies that the design of coordination system early in the post-communist transformations should continue to exercise its influence in the present and that, once adopted, particular organisational configurations will not be significantly altered even in the face of inefficiencies. On a more general level, coordination structures

at the time of accession negotiations will be reproduced in the period after enlargement. Switching from one coordination type to another becomes less and less likely with the passing of time. Opportunities for path-breaking change are provided by 'critical junctures' but the literature is unclear on how we can specify a critical juncture *ex ante*. Without pushing the argument too far so as to over-simplify historical-institutionalist accounts we can reasonably expect persistence rather than change to be the normal, or default, situation.

Optimisation, historical legacies, lock-ins, and institutional choice politics provide different theoretical lenses through which to analyse institutional persistence and change. They put emphasis on different issues (efficiency, path-dependency in a broad and specific sense, interests) and provide (sometimes) diverging empirical expectations. Given the still limited number of observations of changes in EU coordination systems, an empirical analysis, like the one presented below, can at best suggest which perspective is more helpful in explaining the cases and matching the data. The Europeanisation literature, however, can provide some important reference points with regard to the success or failure of institutionalist approaches to explain Europe-driven change in the EU and candidate states.

Europeanisation and Coordination Studies of the Older Member States

In terms of the influence of the EU on administrative structures, most commentators agree that it is mostly indirect (Dimitrova 2002; but see Fournier 1998; Olsen 2002). There is no *acquis* stipulating how the member states should organise the management of EU business (Dimitrova 2002). That said, sometimes EU directives contain concrete requirements for setting up a public organisation or structuring it in a particular way. The Common Assessment Framework (CAF) for quality management adopted by some member states as a voluntary mechanism under the Portuguese Presidency in 2000 seems to indicate that some kind of open coordination is emerging in administrative matters. The signs of actual convergence between the EU member states on coordination of EU affairs or administrative organisation are few and far between, despite references by some experts to a common European Administrative Space (Fournier 1998; OECD 1998). The debate on administrative convergence, however, or the existence of a common European administrative space, took a new turn when studies of enlargement conditionality showed that the EU has affected domestic structures much more in candidate states than in 'old' member states (Dimitrova 2002; Olsen 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The tools and mechanisms of this impact have been studied in recent years in relation to the concept and practice of conditionality (Dimitrova 2002; Grabbe 2001; Héritier 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The findings of this new literature are important for our discussion here in at least two respects. First, while there is now some agreement among

those studying conditionality that through it the EU can successfully push candidate states to adopt external (its own) rules and norms, including institutional rules, the debate is still open on the extent to which domestic factors mediate this impact. A second important implication of the Europeanisation East studies to which Héri-tier (2005: 209) draws attention is that historical-institutionalist ‘stickiness of policy practices and institutional traditions is less likely’.

In the case of the EU coordination systems we look at here, the change of status from a candidate to a member state is an important factor to consider. Conditionality, post-accession, hardly plays a role.¹ We can anticipate pressures of conditionality to be no longer present. It is important, therefore, to look at variables identified by those who have studied EU coordination systems in the ‘old’ member states.

There is an important literature on the development of EU coordination structures at both the European and the national levels (Kassim *et al.* 2000; 2001; Siedentopf and Ziller 1998). These studies provide valuable contributions for understanding what systems have been adopted in Europe, and how they have changed over time. One of the important lessons for the Europeanisation research area is evident in the choice of focus of the studies: EU coordination should be analysed with regard to the system, or population, of organisations that deal with mediating between Brussels and the national capitals rather than focusing on a single organisation or on the public administration in its entirety. The middle-range focus avoids getting the overall picture blurred by the myriads of small-scale institutional changes. The present study follows this approach and conceptualises coordination structures as a system of interrelated organisations. However, it introduces two important distinctions. First, it explicitly identifies four coordination models centred on the prime minister, the cabinet, the Foreign Ministry, or on a separate institution. While all these possibilities have been acknowledged in the literature, usually a simpler typology contrasting foreign affairs with prime ministerial systems is utilised. Second, we distinguish between political and administrative coordination in order to take account of the specific nature of coordination conducted through administrative units, such as ministerial departments or agencies, and coordination conducted through inter-ministerial councils, boards, or committees. Explanations of the causes of the adoption of a type of EU coordination structures have often focused on providing an interpretation of the patterns identified rather than a systematic, deductively-derived explanation. For example, Kassim *et al.* (2000; 2001) resort to various causal forces in order to account for the similarities developed between the member state countries as well as the remaining diversity. Organisational mimicking, socialisation, and optimisation drive the coordination systems closer while the influence of policy styles, political and administrative opportunity structures, and the conceptualisation of coordination are responsible for the remaining divergence. These numerous sources of change

translate into a wide range of potentially important variables and processes, but the existing studies are less informative about how, when, and subject to what conditions one effect trumps or reinforces another. The present account seeks to approach this explanatory challenge by contrasting the three frameworks formulated above and investigating their empirical implications using the data on the evolution of EU coordination systems from CEE. In the next two sections, the EU coordination structures and their development will be presented and discussed.

The Evolution of Coordination Systems

The evolution of relations between the EU, formerly the European Community, and the new and candidate member states from Central and Eastern Europe is by now rather well documented (Avery and Fraser 1998; Baun 2000; Pelkmans and Murphy 1991; Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000; Smith 1999). In the period between the first contacts in the late 1980s/early 1990s and the formal applications for membership (1994–96), relations between the EC/EU and the former communist CEE countries were considered primarily a foreign policy issue and were coordinated by the Foreign Affairs ministries. It was the period from 1998 onwards that saw the biggest impact on domestic structures as candidate states started serious work to adapt to the EU membership criteria formulated in Copenhagen in 1993 and in Madrid in 1994. With the official opening of the negotiations following the Luxembourg (1997) and Helsinki (1999) summits, the candidate countries were faced with increasing pressures for managing accession. These pressures stemmed from the need simultaneously to conduct negotiations, transpose legislation, communicate effectively with the EU institutions, organise the management of the assistance programmes, conduct broader economic and ‘institution-building’ reforms required for a successful bid to join, etc. Complex coordination structures were created to deal with this multitude of tasks which was obviously no longer confined to the domain of foreign policy. The following sections will examine these structures, taking note of their pre- and post-accession evolution, a distinction necessary to illustrate our argument of institutional dynamics.²

Political Coordination at the Top: Collective Bodies for EU Coordination

When looking for the individual or collective body vested with the power to determine policy towards the EU at the highest level, in most states it is the cabinet (Council of Ministers) or the prime minister that sets the general policy and has the ultimate power to solve inter-departmental conflicts.³ Despite the fact that the cabinet and the prime minister constitute the highest level of the coordination machinery, this does not automatically make them the most important ones, or the focal points of the organizational system. They do, however, have the power to take the final

decision in case of disagreement between sectoral interests, and to shape the general course of EU policy development.

During accession, CEE states established a number of high-level institutions with the aim to strengthen political control and handle the negotiations. Ministers without portfolio, deputy prime ministers in charge of EU integration and collective bodies such as ministerial councils of European integration were all part of the institutional innovations aimed to ensure political coordination of EU-related activities. Some of these innovations continue to exist today. These are shown in Table 1, which summarises the patterns of EU coordination in CEE exercised by collective bodies.

TABLE 1
COORDINATION COUNCILS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE NEW
MEMBER STATES FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

	European integration (EI) coordination council		
	Political level		Administrative level
	Inclusive	Exclusive	
Czech Republic	Council for EI 2001–2003	Gov. Committee for EI 1994–2001	Committee for the EU 2003–
Estonia	x	x	Coordination Council
Hungary	Cabinet Committee for EI – until 1998	Cabinet for European Affairs 1996–	Inter-ministerial Committee for EI 1996–
Latvia	EI Council 1995–	x	Council of senior officials 1997–
Lithuania	Governmental EU Commission 1996–	Governmental EI Committee 1995–1996	x
Poland	Political committee	Committee for EI 1996–	European Committee of the Council of Ministers 2004–
Slovenia	x	x	Working group on administrative affairs
Slovak Republic	Ministerial Council of the Government for EI	x	EU Affairs Commission
Bulgaria	Council for EI 2000–2007 (reformed 2005)	Council for EI 1999–2000	Council for EI, 1997–1999; 2007– Council for coordination and monitoring, 2002–2007
Romania	Exec. Committee for EI 2003–	Coordination group 2005–	Interministerial committee for EI 1995–

Source: own compilation based on government websites, documents and interviews with government officials; Brusis and Emmanouilidis (2000); Laffan (2003); and Lippert *et al.* (2001).

As the table shows, Councils for European integration, constituted as a subset of the Council of Ministers, were established in a number of candidate states, and in some they attained considerable power. However, this mechanism for political coordination of EU affairs is not universally present. Governments that did not establish such bodies referred the corresponding tasks either to administrative coordination bodies composed of high-ranking civil servants, or to the full Council of Ministers.

Importantly, we make a distinction between political-level and administrative-level councils. If the Council is composed of high-ranking civil servants or government officials we define it as administrative. If it comprises political figures, usually the prime minister, ministers, chief negotiators, etc., it is listed under the political-level category. Within this group, inclusive and exclusive councils are distinguished even though the difference is subtle: in some countries the council comprises almost all of the ministers and even reaches beyond the core executive, while others bring together a selected few – an inner core of political figures – to deal with the EU.

Comparing the patterns of institutional arrangements in CEE, several observations can be made. First, already at this level, there is a lot of diversity in the adopted organisational solutions. Systems vary according to whether they rely exclusively on the full Council of Ministers (Slovenia), on political-level collective bodies only (Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic prior to 2003, Poland prior to 2004), on administrative-level collective bodies only (Estonia, Bulgaria prior to 1999, Romania prior to 2003, the Czech Republic after 2004), or on the coexistence of political- and administrative-level collective bodies (Hungary, Latvia, Poland after 2004, Bulgaria after 2002, Romania after 2003). Clearly, there is no coherent institutional template.

Most importantly, examining the evolution of coordination systems we find no stable arrangements. In some countries, there are shifts from one pattern of organisation to another; in others organisations are just added to the already existing ones creating an institutional maze and producing second-order coordination needs to integrate the work of first-order coordination structures. Furthermore, these are not the only organisations relevant for EU affairs. Even within the political level there are other figures whose task is to enhance the formulation and communication of a coherent EU policy.

The Posts Embodying European Integration Policy

In response to specific needs arising from the accession negotiations all countries in the region have designated an official (politician or senior civil servant) bearing overall responsibility for EU affairs. These persons have had different status and 'home base' within the government machinery, and their responsibilities and powers also differ. What is common is that these posts were created in response to the need to ensure that there is a clearly

designated person coordinating the daily management of negotiations – chief negotiators. After accession, the task was no longer relevant, but the need to have a person who is the voice of the EU in the country and the voice of the country in the EU remained. Mr or Miss ‘Europe’ cannot assume the formal powers vested in the prime ministers, foreign ministers, or the Council of Ministers, but they embody EU management on a more practical level. Several institutional loci are available for such a post. If the highest ranking public figure responsible for European integration is a secretary of state, chief of the government chancellery or just a deputy minister or state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, he or she carries considerably less symbolic weight in comparison with a deputy prime minister, or a minister of European integration. The range of coordination and management instruments available to the latter is also much wider. Table 2 presents the results.

We should highlight again the variety of institutional configurations adopted. Just like some of the ‘old’ EU member states, some countries resisted for a long time (the Czechs,⁴ Estonians, and Latvians still do) having a member of the government other than the foreign minister responsible for the EU. Against that, in Bulgaria and Romania there are no fewer than two government members with prerogatives in European affairs. This layer of EU coordination also exhibits instability over time. Again, some countries ‘switch’ between models while others add on institutions. At this stage it is evident that the countries from CEE have adopted various institutional arrangements for political coordination of EU affairs. They differ in the symbolic importance attached to the issue, in the relative weight of political vis-à-vis administrative coordination councils, and in the institutional complexity of the resulting arrangements. The analysis so far also highlights that the distinction between prime ministerial and foreign affairs-based systems is too simplistic to capture even the broad aspects of EU coordination in the CEE. In the following section of the paper we take up this issue and look closer at the organisations, or administrative units, conducting the coordination of the day-to-day EU-related policy-making.

Administrative Units for EU Coordination

The councils, committees, and ministers discussed in the previous section provide strategic direction, bear the political responsibility, and have the power ultimately to resolve inter-institutional conflicts in the area of European integration. There are different institutional actors, however, that exercise coordination in regard to the majority of issues that do not normally attain high political salience. The day-to-day management of EU affairs requires a permanent organisation overseeing and monitoring developments, and providing operational and tactical guidance. The institutional arrangements adopted in the CEE countries are summarised in Table 3.

TABLE 2
THE HIGHEST RANKING OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES FROM CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE

Highest ranking officials responsible for European integration						
	Deputy PM	Minister of EI	Minister of EI w/o portfolio	Minister for FA	Dep-min/state secr. of FA	State (under-) secretary
Czech Republic				✓	✓	
Estonia				✓		Director for EU affairs
Hungary			✓ (2004-)		✓ (until 2004)	
Latvia				✓		
Lithuania		✓ (1996-1998)			✓	dep. gov. secretary (1998-)
Poland			gov. pleni-potentiary (until 2004)			✓
Slovenia			✓ (until 2004)			✓ (2004-)
Slovak Republic	✓					
Bulgaria	✓ (2003-)		✓ (2002-)	✓ (until 2002)		
Romania		✓ (2004-)	✓ (-2004; 2004-)			✓

Source: own compilation based on government websites, interviews with government officials; Brusis and Emmanouilidis (2000); Laffan (2003); and Lippert *et al.* (2001).

TABLE 3
 LOCATION OF THE MAIN EU COORDINATION UNIT IN THE GOVERNMENT
 STRUCTURE IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN
 EUROPE

	Location of the main EU coordination unit			
	Separate institution	Attached to the PM	Government office	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Czech Republic				EU department
Estonia		EU Secretariat of State Chancellery, form. Office for EI		
Hungary			Office for European Affairs (from 2005)	State secretariat for integration (until end 2004)
Latvia		European Affairs (formerly EI) Bureau – until 2004		EU department from 2004
Lithuania	Ministry for EI (1996–1998)	European Committee (1998–2004)	Two departments (2004–)	
Poland	Office of the Committee for EI (1996–)		Bureau for EI (1991–1996)	
Slovenia			Government office for EI (1997–; reform 2003)	Department for EU (until 1997)
Slovak Republic			Co-ordination group of the executive (1998–)	EU department
Bulgaria			Coordination Directorate at the Council of Ministers	Euro integration/EU affairs department
Romania	Ministry of EI (2004–)			EI department

Source: own compilation based on government websites, interviews with government officials; Brusis and Emmanouilidis (2000); Laffan (2003); and Lippert *et al.* (2001).

In general, there are four institutional loci possible for central coordinating bodies. They can be a separate institution, or they can be attached to the prime minister's office, or to the Cabinet Office (government secretariat). The latter is a fine distinction and most of the time it is not absolutely clear whether the EU coordination unit serves the prime minister, or the government as a whole.⁵ Finally, as a fourth option, the coordination unit can be situated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Establishing an entirely independent organisational entity centralising EU affairs seems to be a relatively unpopular choice. Only Romania now has a functioning Ministry of European Integration, and only since 2004. Croatia and Lithuania have also had brief experiences with a ministry. The case of Poland is very difficult to classify because the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) definitely does not have the rank of a ministry, but *de facto* is a large, powerful, and well-established agency. It is also not directly subordinated to the prime minister, or to the operational guidance of the government as a whole. It employs more than 200 people (Brusis and Emmanouilidis 2000)⁶ and its head participates in the meetings of the Committee for European Integration together with the ministers. Organisationally, it is not part of the government office, or the administration supporting the prime minister, thus it can be classified as a separate institution, although it does not have the rank of a ministry.

The European Affairs Bureau in Latvia (abolished in 2004) was also quite influential, but more tightly linked to the prime minister. This seems to have been the case for the Lithuanian European Committee which, as with the Latvian Bureau, no longer exists. In Estonia, the EU Secretariat of the State Chancellery (former Office for European Integration) is the major coordination unit in the country and works under the prime minister, supports and advises the prime minister and the government on various EU issues.

Several countries have units situated in the government offices and working for the government as a whole. Such offices exclusively manage EU coordination in Hungary (since 2005), in Lithuania (since 2004), and in Slovenia (since 1997). In the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria they share responsibilities with Foreign Affairs ministries. The Hungarian case is particularly interesting as it exemplifies a switch from a system centred on the Foreign Affairs Ministry to an institution embedded in the government office. In Lithuania, the European Committee was reorganised in 2004 into two departments, both part of the government office, sharing the responsibilities for EU coordination. The Slovenian Office for European Integration, inheriting the central role from a foreign affairs department early in the accession process is very well established, stable, and influential, coming closest to the Polish case, but with the status of a government office. In Bulgaria, a directorate at the Council of Ministers administration and a directorate at Foreign Affairs have roughly equal importance and share the responsibilities for EU coordination.

As of now, a coordination system based in the Foreign Affairs Ministry is to be found in the Czech Republic, although recent interviews suggest that a central government EU department has been gaining in importance.⁷ Hungary was a case where EU coordination was conducted by a department in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, but the reform at the end of 2004/beginning of 2005 shifted the task to the government office. The relevant units in the Foreign Affairs ministries in Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia retain importance while coexisting with other coordination units.

This bird's eye view of institutional arrangements leaves us with one overwhelming impression: that is a lack of convergence and continuing change as opposed to stability.

Interestingly, during accession, there seemed to be a shift towards administrative coordination away from Foreign Affairs ministries, which trend, again, seems to be reversed after accession in a number of countries such as Lithuania and Latvia.⁸ Despite the move towards centralisation, the creation of a strong independent Ministry for European Integration is a rarely employed strategy. Most coordination bodies are situated within the system of organisations working for the government as a collective body and/or for the prime ministers. In most cases, their statutes link them closely with the political or administrative collective body dealing with EU coordination. Their importance and scope of responsibilities, however, depend on another factor not included in the discussion so far – the presence or absence of EU units or working groups in the line ministries. These will, however, remain outside the scope of our paper since we are dealing primarily with coordination.

Having described the basic shape, and pointed out the major transformations of the EU coordination structures set up in CEE over the last ten years, we will proceed to discuss the findings in view of the theoretical perspectives sketched in the beginning of the article.

Towards an Explanation of the Development of EU Coordination Structures

The national development paths of EU coordination structures seem, at least from a cursory look at Tables 1 to 3, highly idiosyncratic. Still, we can group the countries according to the relative stability of the coordination systems adopted. First, early on in the enlargement process Estonia adopted a system that has changed only incrementally. Second, in Slovenia early reforms (before the end of the 1990s) led to quite a stable configuration as well. Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary reformed their coordination structures after the completion of the accession negotiations. The Czechs did too, but their system underwent some evolution before that as well. Bulgaria and Romania show the greatest number of changes, as well as a pattern of adding new organisations to already existing ones. It is probably too early to draw any conclusions regarding Croatia, although we notice that the system has already been overhauled once. Are these patterns explained by efficiency concerns, historical legacies, early institutional choices, or by actors' preferences and changes in domestic politics?

We would argue that the framework in which actors' preferences and domestic politics are defined as central driving forces of institutional change, explains best the pattern we have described so far. In our analysis we will also show how the other two frameworks perform in explaining the same evidence.

The Politics of Institutional Choice

This article argues that a substantial part of the evolution of EU coordination structures in CEE can be explained by the 'politics of institutional choice'. Actors benefit from one organisational configuration more than from another and as a result they try to achieve the more beneficial institutional arrangement. The same institutions might be employed for different ends in accordance with what politicians want. As a result, administrative change is most likely to follow the formation of a new government. As a new (coalition) of political parties achieves power, they will try to mould the organisational environment to suit their purposes and interests. In the case of EU coordination, changes in external EU pressure (more conditionality or conversely less pressure) can provide an opening for change. We do not argue that any kind of change is possible since historical and institutional legacies provide constraints as to what the politicians can do and thus are an important source of cross-national variation, but the essential mechanism is one of generating new institutions as a way to maximise gains.

The case of Bulgaria is a good illustration for some of the aspects of the 'politics of institutional choice' framework. The first substantial reform of the system of EU coordination in 1999 strengthened the administrative coordination which was possible in the context of the centralisation in the executive conducted by the Kostov government. As the prime minister and the foreign minister were from the same party, there was no need for clear division of the responsibilities, or the establishment of checks and balances between the government office and the Foreign Ministry. Gradually, a political-level coordination council was institutionalised first at the level of deputy ministers (1999–2000) and then at the ministerial level (since 2000). The situation changed drastically with the Saxe-Coburg-Gotta government in the later part of 2001. The coordination mechanism was amended to make space for a new minister for European integration. The creation of the post reflects, among other things, the lower interest shown by the then foreign minister in European affairs. Although the new post created a peculiar situation where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to serve two 'masters', reform was still introduced. Further, the declining strength of the prime ministerial position since 2002 and the lack of serious involvement of prime minister Saxe-Coburg-Gotta in EU affairs prompted the establishment of a deputy prime ministerial post with prerogatives in European integration. Under the following coalition government led by socialist Stanishev, coordination was at least partly influenced by coalition politics and the position of minister for EU affairs was given to Meglena Kuneva⁹ from the NDSV party led by Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Post-accession, a last round of changes was introduced in April 2007,¹⁰ when a new, three-step mechanism for EU policy-making was set up and the political position of minister for EU matters was filled again after Kuneva's departure to the

European Commission. The appointment of NDSV member Gergana Grancharova was criticised by the opposition, which claimed that there was no need for EU coordination after accession and that the post was created to find a place for a coalition member defined by a pre-arranged quota.¹¹ The minister of foreign affairs (a socialist) and the newly appointed minister of European integration have joint coordination responsibilities in the new mechanism, again suggesting a political distribution of spheres of influence between the two largest coalition partners. Reflecting Prime Minister Stanishev's position of first among equals in the current coalition government, there is no evidence of ultimate political control vested in his office. A political-level coordination body is present, however, but at a relatively low level, which can be also considered the top administrative level. The European Affairs Council is composed of deputy ministers, the head of the European Union Directorate of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the permanent representative of Bulgaria to the EU and his/her deputy and others.

Some reshuffling of parts of the EU management portfolio (like the management of accession funds) can also be linked to coalition politics. The backbone of the system of administrative coordination, the European Affairs (and International Financial Institutions) Coordination Directorate of the Council of Ministers and the European Union Directorate at Foreign Affairs, remains relatively stable. The two bodies seem to have similar importance also reflected in the comparable number of civil servants they employ (24 for the former and 40 for the latter).

The rate of change in the Bulgarian coordination set-up is matched and even surpassed by the development of the Romanian system. There, however, an important new aspect of the domestic politics environment becomes relevant, and that is the stronger role exercised by the president. The influence of the presidential institution on the coordination mechanism can be found, first, in the greater fragmentation of the top layer of the executive associated with political systems with a strong president, and, second, with the presence of two ministries dealing with EI, one reportedly acting as a conduit of the positions of the president. By no means, however, is the influence of domestic politics on the evolution of the coordination system restricted to Bulgaria and Romania. The changes of the coordination structure in Hungary have been linked with the changing governments, and the relative strength and ambition of their prime ministers (Agh and Rozsas 2003). The creation of the Ministry of European Integration in Croatia has been linked to the need to create an additional post for a coalition partner in the government. Later, when this need was no longer pressing, the post was scrapped and the ministry was merged with Foreign Affairs. In Slovenia, too, the reforms in 1997 followed the establishment of a new government. The stability of the system after that change might be explained by the political continuity in the country (the major party in power was the same from 1997 until the end of 2004). The major reforms of the Lithuanian

coordination system in 1996 have also been interpreted in the context of political struggles in the country in that period (Maniokas 2005). In Poland, the increasing strength of the prime minister contributed to the affirmed position of the Office of the Committee for European Integration and the centralisation of the coordination work in general (Zubek 2001).

Institutional Change as 'Optimisation': Efficiency and Pressure-driven Rational Adaptation

Functional explanations appear to be a powerful alternative to the framework proposed above, given that most reforms are justified, at least at rhetorical level, by efficiency concerns. We argue that they cannot persuasively explain the available evidence. First, the major turning points of the enlargement process – entry into force of the association agreements, the start of the real accession negotiations, accession – translate into quite different institutional choices in the countries studied. Interestingly, early in the process when the demands for management of EU affairs were not so extensive, the organisational structures displayed greatest convergence. The intensification of contacts in the middle of the 1990s brought reforms in most of the states. Neither the timing nor the direction of these reforms, however, can be accounted for by an efficiency-centred argument. The 'demands' of being a real member of the EU (after 2004) produced institutional changes going in opposite directions. Hungary switched towards a system centred on a government department, while Lithuania reorganised its prime minister-based system. The Czech Republic abolished its political-level consultative council in favour of an administrative-level one.

If there is an overall trend to be noted post-accession, it is not towards greater efficiency of the EU coordination systems but, as a recent World Bank study suggests, towards weakening. The study singles out Poland and Slovakia as states which have practically dismantled the pre-accession coordination systems. It notes further that the systems of Lithuania and Latvia have been transformed, resulting in significant weakening in Latvia's case (World Bank 2006: 8).

Another implication of the functionalist rational adaptation framework is that poor performance should lead to change and success should reinforce the status quo. To some extent, this seems to be corroborated by the data. Bulgaria and Romania, the two countries left over from the 2004 enlargement, show the greatest rate of change in the institutional set-up for EU coordination and negotiation. Some of these changes can be directly related to reports highlighting insufficient progress in the accession talks. However, the solutions adopted in the two countries are not similar at all. While Romania has opted for a Ministry of European Integration, another minister without portfolio for EU affairs, and an administrative-level consultative body, in Bulgaria the chief negotiator was

given the post of a minister without portfolio, but the day-to-day coordination remains shared between units in the Council of Ministers' office and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Furthermore, where recent reforms have been introduced, this has not always led to better coordination. Post-reform, Slovak officials have reported problems with selecting a leading ministry for some EU policy dossiers. Slovenia, despite its sophisticated information system supporting coordination, also reports competence disputes. Last, but not least, despite having the worst transposition record among 2004 entrants to the EU, the Czech Republic was slow to re-design its system.

Linked to this, feedback from performance to reform is not evident regarding the success of transposition and implementation of EU law during and after accession. While at a very general level, the institutionalisation of coordination structures in the late 1990s *was* linked to the need to adopt the *acquis communautaire*, the rate of transposition was probably affected by further changes to the system but did not exclusively motivate them.

The Impact of Historical Legacies and Early Institutional Lock-in

Explanations referring to policy or regulatory styles, administrative cultures, or constitutional legacies are prominent in the study of the Europeanisation of national public administrations (Kassim *et al.* 2000; 2001; Knill 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). However, it is quite difficult to distinguish the former communist states from each other with regard to administrative styles and traditions. The common totalitarian past is only part of the conceptual problem: it is an open question whether we can speak at all of any institutionalised policy-making and implementation styles in CEE, and how far back in time we have to search for their sources (Brusis 2003).

If we insist on investigating the 'impact of the past', we must note that the national characteristics of policy-making during the communist period have been quite similar (coupling of the state and party organisation, extreme fragmentation and sectorisation, low capacity for policy formulation in the public administration, centralism, poor coordination through official channels, political interference) due to the effects of the planned economy and one-party rule.¹² As for pre-communist traditions such as the influence of the Austro-Hungarian empire or post-communist regional influences, there is nothing specific that seems to distinguish the Visegrad countries from the rest in terms of EU coordination. On the contrary, instead of convergence, we find examples from the whole range of possible structures for coordination of EU affairs in these four countries. Historical legacies, understood in a very broad sense, do not seem to matter.¹³

Following Kassim *et al.* (2000) and Lippert and Umbach (2005) we should consider another aspect of the influence of the past – constitutional

doctrines and politico-administrative principles. Variation within CEE with regard to these factors is finer than it is possible to capture at the current state of knowledge about government and politics in CEE. Separation of powers, cabinet government, ministerial autonomy, collective responsibility, sectoral non-interference, judicial oversight are all principles enshrined in the constitutional practice of all the countries concerned. All legal systems are based on the continental type. While levels of decentralisation and regionalisation differ, in none of the countries can regional actors be considered a defining characteristic of governance. We do not dismiss the general importance and influence of constitutional doctrines and principles, but the similarity of the countries on the one hand and the divergence of coordination outcomes on the other casts doubt on their utility as an explanation in this case.

We have so far refrained from emphasising the incongruity of the most obvious result of our empirical analysis – the amount and rate of changes – with historical-institutionalist reasoning. After all, even if we assume that the various institutional arrangements adopted are shaped in some way by legacies from the past, we still have to explain how the organisational transformations are linked with these legacies. Posing the question in such terms brings into the discussion the potential influence of early choices and their path-constraining effect. According to this more sophisticated version of historical institutionalism, increasing returns provided by the adoption of certain organisational arrangements would lock in long-term development on a specific course (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). It is not difficult to imagine micro-level causal mechanisms that can provide a rationale for the applicability of path-dependency to the evolution of EU coordination structures. First, every organisation induces vested interests for the actors working within or with it. Once a minister has been given certain powers those powers will be more difficult to take away. Second, the establishment of an organisation implies substantial fixed costs for a building, technical infrastructure, staffing, etc. Third, the change of an institutional structure gives rise to legal ‘fixed costs’: drafting of statutes, changing the related normative acts already in force, valuable time for cabinet and parliament meetings, etc. Despite the theoretical plausibility of the ‘increasing returns’ argument, the data we found contradicts it (at least in the majority of cases). EU coordination structures are surprisingly difficult to lock in on a certain development path. Vested interests are overcome, and additional costs for setting up new organisations are just accepted, as countries change from one system of coordination to another. Recent examples are abundant. Hungary moved from a prototypical foreign affairs-based system to a government-centred one. The Czech Republic traded a political-level coordination council, existing under different names for almost ten years, for an administrative-level one in 2003. The position of a minister without portfolio for European integration was abolished in Slovenia.

Conclusions

A framework based on historical institutionalist arguments in their various manifestations as broad historical legacies, constitutional principles, and path-dependency fails to explain the dynamics of coordination configurations in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. Several interpretations of the weak explanatory power of historical-institutionalist arguments are possible. It might be the case that the temporal span of our study is too short. During a longer period of time the coordination structures might settle down after the initial period of institutional ferment. Alternatively, organisational forms as such might not be susceptible to path-dependent processes – organisational changes might be too much on the surface of institutional development to be susceptible to the influences of the past. If supported by future research, this conjecture would be an important restriction on the scope of historical-institutionalist theory. A third way to interpret the lack of ‘stickiness’ of the EU coordination structures in the new member states is to attribute it to the abnormality of the political and administrative systems in CEE during the period of our study. The easiness and haphazardness of organisational changes might be just another malady of the post-communist transformations. Even if the empirical setting of our study has been an inhospitable testing ground for historical institutionalism, the shift of theoretical focus we proposed from functional and structural constraints on institutional development to the agents of organisational reform retains its broader appeal.

Having examined the potential explanatory power of three different frameworks to account for the dynamic changes in domestic coordination systems, we find that understanding institutional change in the context of domestic politics offers the most useful way forward. After all, concerns about efficiency and fixed costs are only influential through being part of the considerations real actors have in designing institutions. The decision-makers in regard to these issues in the democracies in CEE are the politicians in power and sometimes the higher civil servants. Taking an explicitly actor-centred approach and focusing on the incentives politicians and bureaucrats might have to reform or not the institutional structure brings us some way towards understanding the patterns of change of EU coordination structures in CEE.

It is important to emphasise that our claim is not that every single institutional change can be attributed to struggles for power between different parties, within a coalition, between the prime minister, foreign minister and other members of the of the government, or between politicians and high-level civil servants. We would insist, however, that looking at the changes from a ‘politics of institutional choice’ perspective provides the most plausible explanation of the institutional dynamism we have recorded. We cannot do away with the politicians in power in the analysis, as they are

the major agents of decisions about institutional persistence and change. Politicians are able to amplify pressures for change when they want and mute them when they do not. Within the institutional constraints they have much leeway to amend the organisational arrangements for handling EU affairs.

The framework we dubbed 'the politics of institutional choice' is in some senses cynical, as it treats efficiency concerns and administrative culture as tools in the games political actors play over institutional choice. In another sense, it is more pragmatic as it points to concrete actors and decisions as the forces leading to institutional change instead of highlighting traditions and legacies which are beyond any individual human control. We tried to show that the bulk of reforms of EU coordination structures can be traced back to the relative power between the major actors (prime minister, cabinet, minister of foreign affairs, parties in power). In conclusion, we hope we have shown that, veiled behind the maze of organisations and acronyms, domestic coordination of European integration presents an exciting world for the study of institutional persistence and change.

Acknowledgements

Some of the ideas discussed in this paper emerged in earlier collaboration of one of the authors with Klaudijus Maniokas. We are especially grateful to him for his contribution and subsequent advice and helpful comments. We also thank two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. At the time of submission and review of this article Antoaneta Dimitrova was Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the EUI and gratefully acknowledges the Centre's support.

Notes

1. With the possible exception of safeguard mechanisms such as the ones adopted in the Accession treaty with Bulgaria and Romania.
2. We separate political and administrative structures, although in practice the tasks performed by the new institutions often cross the boundaries between the technical and the political.
3. In some semi-presidential systems such as Romania, the president might also claim a share in shaping EU policy at the top.
4. Since August 2006, there is a minister for European affairs also in the Czech Republic.
5. It is a potentially misleading indicator, as in most countries in the region the prime minister does not have a separate office, but is served by the government secretariat. Sometimes, however, this secretariat is *de facto* working more for the prime minister than for the collective government. So the separation between these two categories is still relevant in terms of political leadership and guidance of the EU policy process.
6. According to interviewed civil servants, this figure is closer to 400.
7. And Croatia, which as a candidate state is not included systematically in this analysis. So far the country seems to follow a similar pattern. The Croatian case is interesting as there

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself was merged with the Ministry of European Integration, thus European integration has quite a share of the organisational structure and work of the resulting organisation.

8. We thank Klaudijus Maniokas for advice on developments in the Baltic states.
9. Her appointment could be said to have been a happy coincidence of her expert background for the job with political deals for balancing major posts between the coalition partners.
10. Government Decree No. 85, 17 April 2007 for coordination and organisation of EU-related issues.
11. Statement of UDF member of parliament during the parliamentary debate on the new mechanism.
12. What differs, of course, is the quality of public administration and civil service. However, to equate administrative professionalisation, or stability, autonomy, efficiency, etc. with historical legacies is to confound causes and effects.
13. Dimitrov *et al.* (2006: 20) suggest that the frequent changes of the coordination machineries might not be an 'indicator of a generalized institutional malaise but of provisional institution building'.

References

- Agh, A., and A. Rozsas (2003). 'Managing Europe from Home: The Europeanization of the Hungarian Core Executive', *OEUE Phase I. Occasional Paper*.
- Alexander, G. (2001). 'Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13:3, 249–70.
- Avery, G., and C. Fraser (1998). *The Enlargement of the European Union*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
- Bailey, D., and L.D. Propris (2004). 'A Bridge too Phare? EU Pre-accession Aid and Capacity-building in the Candidate Countries', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42:1, 77–98.
- Baun, M.J. (2000). *A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Brusis, M. (2003). 'Institutional Culture, Party Government or Europeanisation? Explaining Executive Change in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary', paper prepared for Arbeitskreis Postsozialistische Gesellschaften, DVPW-Kongress.
- Brusis, M., and J. Emmanouilidis (2000). 'Negotiating EU Accession: Policy Approaches of Advanced Candidate Countries from Central and Eastern Europe', unpublished manuscript, Bertelsmann Foundation.
- Dimitrov, V., K. Goetz and W. Wollmann (2006). *Governing After Communism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Dimitrova, A. (2002). 'Enlargement, Institution-building and the EU's Administrative Capacity Requirement', *West European Politics*, 25:4, 171–90.
- Elster, J., C. Offe and U. Preuss (1998). *Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Farrell, H., and A. Héritier (2006). 'Introduction: Contested Competences in the European Union', *West European Politics*, 30:2, 227–43.
- Fournier, J. (1998). 'Governance and European Integration – Reliable Public Administration', in *OECD Sigma Papers No. 23 (Ccnm/sigma/puma(98)39)*. Paris: OECD, 119–35.
- Grabbe, H. (2001). 'How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8:6, 1013–31.
- Grzymala-Busse, A. (2006). 'The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions. Postcommunist Party Competition and State Oversight', *Comparative Political Studies*, 39:3, 271–300.
- Harmsen, R. (1999). 'The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative Study of France and the Netherlands', *Governance*, 12:1, 81–113.

- Héritier, A. (2005). 'Europeanization Research East and West: A Comparative Assessment', in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.), *The Europeanization of Eastern Europe*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 199–209.
- Hesse, J., Y. Venna and T. Verheijen (1997). *Strategy Options for Public Administration Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: An Assessment of the Current Situation and Recommendations for Future Phare Strategy. Phare Final Report Project No. 96-0619/96-0644*. Nuffield College, University of Oxford, European Centre for Comparative Government and Public Policy, Berlin, European Institute for Public Administration, Maastricht.
- Heyen, E.V., ed. (1992). *Early European Community Administration*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Jupille, J. (2004). *Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kassim, H., G.B. Peters and V. Wright, eds. (2000). *The National Coordination of EU Policy. The Domestic Level*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kassim, H., A. Menon, G.B. Peters and V. Wright, eds. (2001). *The National Coordination of EU Policy. The European Level*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Knill, C. (2001). *The Europeanization of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Knill, C., and D. Lehmkuhl (2002). 'The National Impact of European Union Regulatory Policy: Three Europeanization Mechanisms', *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, 255–80.
- Knill, C., and A. Lenschow (1998). 'Change as "Appropriate Adaptation": Administrative Adjustment to European Environmental Policy in Britain and Germany', *European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)*, 2:1, 1–25.
- Laffan, B. (2003). 'Managing Europe from Home. Impact of the EU on Executive Government. A Comparative Analysis', *OEUE Phase I. Occasional Paper*.
- Lippert, B., and G. Umbach (2005). *The Pressure of Europeanisation: From Post-Communist State Administrations to Normal Players in the EU System*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Lippert, B., G. Umbach and W. Wessels (2001). 'Europeanization of CEE Executives: EU Membership Negotiations as a Shaping Power', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8:6, 980–1012.
- Mahoney, J., and D. Schensul (2006). 'Historical Context and Path Dependence', in R. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds.), *Contextual Political Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 454–71.
- Maniokas, K. (2005). 'Road to Negotiations: Enlargement Instruments and the Development of Lithuania's Status', in K. Maniokas, R. Vilpisauskas and D. Zeruolis (eds.), *Lithuania's Road to the European Union: Unification of Europe and Lithuania's EU Accession Negotiations*. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 19–58.
- OECD (1998). *Preparing Public Administrations for the European Administrative Space*. Paris: OECD.
- Olsen, J.P. (2002). 'Towards a European Administrative Space?', *ARENA Working Papers*, 02/26.
- Pelkmans, J., and A. Murphy (1991). 'Catapulted into Leadership: The Community's Trade and Aid Policies vis-à-vis Eastern Europe', *Journal of European Integration*, 14:2–3, 125–51.
- Pierson, P. (2003). 'Big, Slow-moving, and... Invisible: Macro-social Processes and Contemporary Political Science', in J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 177–207.
- Pierson, P., and T. Skocpol (2002). 'Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science', in I. Katznelson and H. Milner (eds.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. New York: W.W. Norton, 693–721.
- Schimmelfennig, F., and U. Sedelmeier, eds. (2005). *Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Sedelmeier, U., and H. Wallace (2000). 'Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?', in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds.), *Policy Making in the European Union*. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shepsle, K.A. (2001). 'A Comment on Institutional Change', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13:3, 321–5.

- Shepsle, K.A., and M.S. Bonchek (1997). *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Siedentopf, H., and J. Ziller (1998). *Making European Policies Work: The Implementation of Community Legislation in the Member States*. Maastricht: EIPA.
- Smith, K.E. (1999). *The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe*. London: Macmillan.
- Thelen, K. (1999). 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 369–404.
- Vachudova, M.A. (2005). *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Verheijen, T. (2000). *Administrative Capacity Development: A Race against Time? WRR Working Document 107*. The Hague: Scientific Council for Government Policy.
- Verheijen, T., and A. Dimitrova (1996). 'Private Interests and Public Administration: The Central and East European Experience', *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 62:2, 197–218.
- World Bank (2006). *EU-8: Administrative Capacity in the New Member States: The Limits of Innovation*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Yao, Y. (2004). 'Political Process and Efficient Institutional Change', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 16:3, 439–53.
- Zubek, R. (2001). 'A Core in Check: The Transformation of the Polish Core Executive', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8:6, 911–32.